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Whether a legislative enactment is a statute of limitations
or whether it is a time limitation inherent in the substantive cause
of action itself may be ascertained from a proper construction of
its terms. Generally, in those instances where the limitation clause
is found in the section which creates the right of action, the time
limitation 74will be construed as being part of the substantive cause
of action.

This distinction is illustrated by Shoddy v. Shoddy,75 where
plaintiff brought a marital action for annulment on the ground
of fraud. The action was commenced five years after the discovery
of the alleged fraud. The court, in dismissing the complaint, held
that it was required to apply the three-year period of limitations
even though the time limitation was not pleaded as a defense.
The court noted that the inclusion of the three-year time limitation
in both CPLR 214(7) and Section 140(e) of the Domestic
Relations Law indicated an intent on the part of the legislature
to make time a substantive condition of the action. Therefore, once
the time limitation had elapsed, the court was without jurisdiction
to pronounce a decree dissolving the marriage.76
CPLR 3211(e): Inclusion of counterclaim in answer not a waiver
of jurisdictional objection.
In M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale &

Sons, Inc. 7 7 defendant's answer contained both a jurisdictional

objection and a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction
sued upon by the plaintiff. The appellate division, first department,
held that the defendant did not waive its jurisdictional objection
by the inclusion of the counterclaim in its answer.
There does not appear to be a substantial reason why a
jurisdictional objection should be lost merely because it is coupled
with a defense on the merits,7 and also joined with a counterclaim which reflects "the same issues as that defense." 79 CPLR
320(b) specifies that the proper place for a counterclaim is in the
answer, and CPLR 3211(e) provides that defendant may raise
his jurisdictional objection either by way of motion or in the
answer. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the court to say that
defendant's jurisdictional objection is waived by including a counterclaim in the very place authorized by the CPLR.
74The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886).

7550 Misc. 2d 74, 269 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1966).
761d. at 74-75, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
77 26 App. Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S2d 672 (1st Dep't 1966).
784 WEiNsTEIN, KoRxu & MILER, NEw YoRa CIViL PRACnCE 1 3211.05
(1965).
79 M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc.,
26 App. Div. 2d 52, 53, 270 N.Y.S2d 672, 674 (1st Dep't 1966).
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While this case concerned a counterclaim related to the main
cause of action, a situation may arise where the defendant pleads
a counterclaim unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action. This
situation may present a problem where, as in the instant case,
jurisdiction is obtained over the defendant pursuant to New York's
long-arm statute.8 0
Under CPLR 302(b), the defendant's appearance gives the
court personal jurisdiction only with respect to causes of action
arising under CPLR 302(a). When, as in Katz, the defendant
pleads a counterclaim related to the main claim, it is clear that
he has not jeopardized this protection, since the plaintiff is similarly
free to include causes of action related to the main claim. However,
when the defendant pleads a counterclaim unrelated to the main
claim, the court could reasonably consider this to be a waiver of
this protection, and thus permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint
to include causes of action similarly unrelated to CPLR 302.
Alternatively, the court in such a case could limit the defendant's
waiver and only allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to
include causes of action which are related to the defendant's
counterclaim.
CPLR 3215(h): Amendment.
This new provision authorizes the court clerk to enter default
judgment for failure to comply with a stipulation of settlement.
It requires that the stipulation be entered into subsequent to the
commencement of the action, and that it provide for entry of
judgment without further notice to the other party. The stipulation
must also be accompanied by both an affidavit as to the failure
to comply with the terms of the stipulation, as well as with either
a complaint or a concise statement reiterating the facts on which
the claim was based.
CPLR 3219: Amendment.
This provision provides that an amount tendered in satisfaction
of an asserted contract claim is to be deposited with the court
clerk for safekeeping and that such amount is not to be deemed
paid into court. The amendment provides that the clerk shall
place such money "in the safe or vault of the court to be provided
for the safekeeping thereof" until a disposition is made of it.
It further provides that, if the amount is neither withdrawn by
claimant nor returned to the depositor within a ten-day period,
the amount will be deemed paid into court, and payment thereof
will be made by the court clerk to the county treasurer or director
80 Either CPLR 302 or its counterpart CCA § 404 might be employed.

